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Vocational training in the face of uncertainty
as to the rate of retention of trainees
on completion of training*
Lutz Bellmann and Florian Janik**
The article deals with the impact of uncertainty as regards the retention of trainees
completing vocational training programmes on firms’ training behaviour. As an alter-
native to vocational training, the external recruitment of skilled workers is considered
via an opportunity costs approach. The uncertainty is traced back to staff turnover,
considerable product market competition and changing skill requirements. Indicators
of these causes of uncertainty are examined as to their impact on vocational training
and the recruitment of skilled workers with a fractional logit model, using a seemingly
unrelated cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator with data from the IAB Establishment
Panel. There is no empirical evidence that the presumed correlations exist in manufac-
turing. A negative correlation is identified in the service sector between high staff
turnover coupled with rapid change in the skills required on the one hand, and commit-
ment to vocational training on the other, while there is a positive link with the external
recruitment of skilled workers. This is interpreted as an indication that uncertainty
with regard to retention after training can go some way towards explaining the growing
gap between employment and vocational training in the tertiary sector.
* This paper was released for publication in July 2007.
** We would like to thank Simon Jansen and two anonymous referees from the Zeitschrift für Arbeits-
marktForschung for their helpful remarks.
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1 Introduction
Year after year, many young people fail to obtain a
vocational training place and as a result frequently
attend state-funded skill-building schemes. Manifold
reasons have been expressed in the public debate
for this dramatic situation, which has been continu-
ing for years despite various promotional pro-
grammes and the “Pakt für Ausbildung” (Pact for
Training). Too high training costs, inadequate or-
ders, a lack of job prospects after training and insuf-
ficiently qualified applicants are frequently referred
to in this context. Tertiarisation is commonly identi-
fied as a further reason for this development. Firstly
because the rationalisation processes in manufactur-
ing and the concomitant reduction of employment
also reduce the number of training places, and sec-
ondly because the ratio between training places of-
fered and the number of employees is deteriorating
in the service sector (Baethge et al. 2007).
The stiffer competition faced by firms at both na-
tional and international level is indicated as a fur-
ther reason for firms providing less vocational train-
ing. The results of the IAB Establishment Panel also
suggest that firms engage in less training because
they are unsure as to whether they will be able to
offer subsequent employment to the trained work-
ers if they enter into a training agreement, because
of the considerable competitive pressure and the un-
certainty with regard to their income situation which
this entails (cf. Bellmann/Hartung 2005). Another
reason that is frequently expressed for firms’ reti-
cence when it comes to vocational training lies in the
organisation and structure of the German system of
vocational training as such. Where firms are not only
subject to considerable competitive pressure, but are
also operating in innovative fields in which worker
skill requirements are high and subject to rapid
change, one may presume that vocational training,
withitsfirmlyestablished trainingcontentoverwhich
the firms have little influence, is not the right source
of skilled workers because it is too uncertain whether
the training contents actually match the current re-
quirements at the end of the training period. For
these reasons, the external recruitment of skilled
workers may be preferred over vocational training.
Both arguments entail the hypothesis that uncer-
tainty influences firms’ training behaviour and that
increasing uncertainty has a negative influence on it.
This uncertainty is modelled in this paper using the
probability of a trainee not remaining in the firm on
completion of his/her training. Firms respond to a
low expected retention rate and reduce their com-
mitment to vocational training. At the same time,
the recruitment of already trained workers to cover
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the need for skills becomes more attractive because
of falling opportunity costs.
Evidence of this circumstance is provided by Falk
(2002), who studied firms employing or seeking ICT
specialists. The enterprises were surveyed in 2000, in
other words during the IT boom. The ICT sector is
a very good example of the modern, innovative sec-
tors of the economy. If these firms need additional
skilled labour, then overtime, outsourcing and the
use of freelancers are preferred to creating training
places. Particularly in technical and entrepreneurial
services, the firms state that they prefer ICT special-
ists who have graduated from university over their
own in-house trainees (Falk 2002). This finding is
not without its detractors, however. Steedman et al.
(2006) and Steedman/Wagner (2007) reach the con-
clusion in a comparative analysis of the United
Kingdom and Germany that, particularly in the ICT
field, dual training is more attractive for enterprises
in Germany than the recruitment of external skilled
workers, since the trainees in the dual system can
be deployed more flexibly if they are provided with
appropriate further training.
Various studies have examined the impact of high
resignation rates and retention rates on vocational
training. They all reach the conclusion that these re-
duce the provision of training by firms (Niederalt
2004, Beckmann 2002a, Neubäumer/Bellmann 1999).
Smits/Zwick (2004) provide empirical evidence for
the presumption that the matching of the skills pro-
vided in vocational training with the actual skill re-
quirements poses a greater problem in the service
sector than it does in manufacturing. A number of
studies (e.g. Wolter et al. 2006, Hartung/Leber 2004,
Beckmann 2002a) take into account the impact of
the share of skilled workers on training provision
and training intensity, but the impact on the external
recruitment of skilled workers and commitment to
vocational training has so far not been the subject
of studies using establishment data.
The text is structured as follows: the second chapter
presents the theoretical model, which is discussed
particularly with regard to the uncertainty of further
employment after completion of training. The third
part follows with the empirical examination, using
data taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. The
fourth and final part summarises the results and also
interprets them in relation to the refinement of the
dual system of vocational training.
2 Vocational training or external
recruitment?
In the model used here, vocational training is re-
garded as a part of staff planning reaching beyondLutz Bellmann and Florian Janik To recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own?
the training period, with the aim of meeting firms’
requirements in terms of skilled workers. As an al-
ternative to vocational training, firms can also re-
cruit skilled workers via the external labour market.
These arguments are based on considerations made
by Franz/Soskice (1995) and taken up by Niederalt
(2004), and are used below as a basis for modelling.
2.1 Recruitment costs: opportunity
income of vocational training
It is not worthwhile for firms to invest in general
human capital where there is complete competition
on labour markets, since they have no guarantee
that individuals who have received general training
will remain in the firm on completion of the skill-
building measure. If the trainees leave, the firm can
no longer benefit from the increase in productivity
as a result of training and bears only its costs
(Becker 1964). Investment in general human capital
is only worthwhile for firms if the trainees are paid
wages after completion of training which are lower
than their productivity, and thus a margin can be
realised. This type of remuneration is conditional on
a compressed wage structure in which, as skills in-
crease, wages grow less quickly than productivity
(Acemoglu/Pischke 1998, 1999a, 1999b). This means
that vocational training is only profitable for enter-
prises if those completing training can be paid less
than skilled workers recruited externally. This can
not be described clearly in either theoretical or em-
pirical terms (Niederalt 2004). If it is therefore as-
sumed for the sake of simplicity that the wages and
the productivity of internally-trained workers are
the same as those of externally-recruited skilled
workers at least after a certain familiarisation phase,
the vocational training decision can be modelled via
the concept of opportunity income (Niederalt 2004,
Wolter/Schweri 2002, v. Bardeleben et al. 1995).
In this view, the focus is not on productivity being
higher than remuneration as the source of earnings
from vocational training, but on meeting the need
for skilled workers. The opportunity income derived
from vocational training can be deduced by compar-
ing it with the recruitment of skilled workers on the
external labour market, in other words cost advanta-
ges gained by retaining trained workers who have
completed in-house training (Niederalt 2004). This
opportunity income consists of:
Ð staff acquisition costs being avoided (Franz/
Soskice 1995), since it is no longer necessary to
look for and select skilled workers from the exter-
nal labour market;
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Ð familiarisation costs being avoided because the
new employees already know the firm (Kau 1997);
Ð savings being gained by stabilising the wage and
salary structure (Cramer/Müller 1994);
Ð costs being avoided as a result of lower staff turn-
over since those completing training remain in the
firm longer (Cramer/Müller 1994) and because of
a reduced risk of recruiting the wrong employees
(Franz/Soskice 1995).
Considerations made by Niederalt (2004) are used
in modelling this decision on the part of the firm.
The modelling extends to the time when both alter-
natives lead to equivalent results, which in this case
applies after the familiarisation of the externally re-
cruited skilled workers in the firm. If it is assumed
that an additional need for skilled workers exists
prior to commencement of training for the period
s + 1, the transaction costs of familiarisation lead to
more or less fixed costs being incurred for the re-
cruitment of external skilled workers. If these trans-
action costs, which conversely can also be regarded
as opportunity income gained from internal training,
are higher than the net costs of training, vocational
training is worthwhile for the firm. The following








where RK  recruitment costs for external skilled
workers, and NK  net costs of vocational training.
Therefore, if the recruitment costs, which conversely
can also be interpreted as opportunity income
gained from vocational training, exceed the net costs
of training, it becomes attractive for the firm to pro-
vide apprenticeships. This decision rule is, however,
based on the assumption that all people completing
training remain in the firm. If some or all of the
trainees leave the firm on completion of training,
the need for skilled workers must be at least partly
met via the external market. It is therefore only pos-
sible to avoid recruitment costs for those trainees
who do remain in the firm. The decision rule must
therefore be supplemented by the retention rate q








with 0  q  1.
Therefore the lower the retention rate q is, the lower
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ing is, and hence the lower the costs must be to en-
courage firms to invest in training. If it is assumed
that workers who have completed vocational train-
ing may be substituted by workers who have other
qualifications (from vocational academies, technical
colleges, universities etc.), it can be shown that the
costs of these substitutions are already accommo-
dated in the possibilities of recruiting (Niederalt
2004). Short-term productivity differences due to
the firm-specific human capital which is imparted in
on-the-job vocational training, as well as temporary
additional wage costs which may be caused by exter-
nal recruitment, can also be modelled by the recruit-
ment costs (Niederalt 2004). Vocational training is
consequently always profitable with a given need for
skilled labour if the net training costs are lower than
the costs of the external recruitment of skilled work-
ers, taking into account the retention rate of those
completing internal vocational training.
2.2 Uncertainty and vocational training
This retention rate is, however, unknown to firms at
the time of the training decision. Whether voca-
tional training is profitable or not is thus uncertain
for them at this time. The higher the retention rate
is estimated to be, the more likely it is that firms’
vocational training is also valued as worthwhile.1
Three different sources of this uncertainty are dis-
cussed below with regard to the impact on the deci-
sion-making situation described.
Acemoglu/Pischke (1998, 1999b) argue on the basis
of the classic human capital theory that provision
of vocational training vitally depends on the firm’s
resignation rate. The authors reach the conclusion
that there are two equilibrium states of participation
in training, namely the “low quit Ð high training”
and the “high quit Ð low training” equilibriums. The
argument is structured as follows: if a firm’s rate of
voluntary departures is high, the continued employ-
ment of trained workers is also uncertain; the reten-
tion rate is therefore estimated to be relatively low.
This leads to the employer having less pronounced
monopoly power over the workers, which in turn re-
duces the incentive to invest in general human capi-
tal. Beckmann (2002a) shows that this model can be
expanded to accommodate the risk of poaching, in
other words the probability that a trained worker is
recruited away by another firm. It can be said in
very general terms that low stability of employment
1 If, however, the firm does not incur any costs at all due to train-
ing (NK = 0), vocational training is even worthwhile with an ex-
pected retention rate of q =0 .
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relationships also reduces the expected retention
rate and hence the opportunity income, therefore
also reducing the provision of vocational training.
In their theoretical analysis Acemoglu/Pischke pre-
sume that the retention rate q depends primarily on
the exogenously-stated resignation rate of workers
in the firm, but state elsewhere that q denotes the
probability that the worker or the firm, or both, suf-
fer an adverse shock and therefore separate (Ace-
moglu/Pischke 1999b). Stevens (1994) also empha-
sises that it is continued employment per se which
is vital to the vocational training calculation and not
whether employment is terminated by the employer
or employee. The reasons for retention or separa-
tion after training can thus be traced not only to the
trainees and to potential third-party employers, but
also to the training firm itself. These sources of un-
certainty are discussed in detail below.
One of these sources of uncertainty is for instance
the argument put forward by Baethge et al. (2007)
that firms which are subject to strong national or
international competitive pressure react to this by
applying new methods of enterprise control which
reduce firms’ involvement in training. This argument
can be integrated into the decision-making calcula-
tion with the aid of the above uncertainty considera-
tions. The more a firm is in competition, the more
difficult it is for the firm to foresee at the time of
the training decision whether it will be possible to
offer jobs to the trainees on completion of training.
A firm which finds itself in such a situation will thus
tend to estimate a low retention rate q, which in-
creases the incentive to meet the need for skilled
workers via external recruitment. According to this
argument, high competitive pressure can be re-
garded as a source of uncertainty. Hence firms which
are subject to strong national or international com-
petitive pressure can be expected to train fewer ap-
prentices. This does not mean, however, that firms
which find themselves in such a competition situa-
tion have no need of skilled workers. If competition
is not for the lowest price, but for the highest quality,
one may indeed anticipate the opposite. On the ba-
sis of this argument it is rather to be anticipated that
these firms will tend to meet their needs via the ex-
ternal labour market instead of by investing in their
own vocational training programmes.
The organisation of vocational training can also be
regarded as an even more significant cause of the
uncertainty of continued employment because of its
consequences. If one presumes, as Acemoglu/Pischke
(1999b) do, that the need for skilled workers also
increases with modern production techniques, it ap-
pears initially also to be consistent that these firmsLutz Bellmann and Florian Janik To recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own?
are very much committed to vocational training. The
opposite may apply, however, if modern production
techniques are also accompanied by constant chan-
ges in these techniques, if the firms are therefore
operating in highly innovative fields. Bartel/Lichten-
berg (1987) state that jobs held by the highly skilled
are more short-term, since the half-life of knowl-
edge relating to new products and procedures is par-
ticularly short. Heidenreich (1998) argues that the
vocational training system that is typical of an indus-
trial society is therefore coming under pressure in
three areas in line with the transition towards the
service society, and the new forms of organisation
and work which this entails:
 Firstly, today’s vocational training system spans
firms, in other words the standardised, uniform
training content is negotiated between the cham-
bers, the employers’ associations and the trade un-
ions. Firm-specific, and hence variable, require-
ments as to qualifications, can be integrated in
principle in the context of the dual training sys-
tem, but this is hardly practiced at present.
 Furthermore, it is presumed that the industrial
form of organisation, compartmentalised as it is
according to functions with specific qualifications,
constitutes a stumbling block to firms’ innovative-
ness. Work and organisation processes are thus
being restructured in many enterprises in order to
take account of these new requirements. Voca-
tional training is, however, primarily orientated in
line with the old functional units. Apprentices are
therefore trained mostly in a particular depart-
ment, and are more rarely given access to differ-
ent areas or processes. Training therefore fre-
quently becomes less attractive for innovative or-
ganisations in particular.
 Finally, the dual training system is also coming un-
der pressure as a result of educational expansion,
and by virtue of the expansion of skill-intensive
services. Because of educational expansion, firms
can also place school-leavers or graduates in me-
dium-ranking posts where more interdisciplinary
thinking and acting is expected. This group of in-
dividuals thus competes with vocational training
graduates. People completing training in the dual
system are in a relatively poor position, which de-
creases the perspectives of those with vocational
training, and the same therefore applies to their
attractiveness for future employers.
There is therefore uncertainty for the firm as to
whether the skills imparted in vocational training
are indeed useable and whether they must separate
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from the trainees after completion of training, which
corresponds to a lower expected retention rate q.
The firm would then have to meet the skill require-
ments by recruiting external skilled workers, despite
having invested in vocational training, which accord-
ingly reduces the opportunity income obtained from
internal training, thus making it less attractive.
In the case of uncertainty, firms therefore tend to
opt against vocational training for a variety of rea-
sons, and are more likely to recruit a skilled worker.
This is firstly because at the beginning of vocational
training it is uncertain whether the trained worker
will leave the training firm of his/her own volition.
Secondly, it is also possible for changes to take place
on the sales and buying markets, in particular those
subject to high competitive pressure, which can
make one or more jobs obsolete. Thirdly, what is
more, firms are uncertain as to whether the skill re-
quirements are met by the content of the training.
These may have altered for instance as a result of
technical and organisational changes.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The IAB Establishment Panel of 2005 is used for
the analysis below. This is a survey which has been
conducted annually since 1993 in western Germany
and since 1996 in eastern Germany, generally using
oral interviews. The population covers all establish-
ments which have at least one employee subject to
social security contributions.2 Because of the funda-
mental differences existing between the labour and
training markets in eastern and western Germany
(cf. Beckmann 2002b), the following analyses are
confined to western Germany, only. One focus of
the IAB Establishment Panel in 2005 was the staff
recruitment process, in particular that of skilled
workers (cf. Bellmann et al. 2006).
3.2 Empirical strategy and econometric
modelling
According to the theoretical considerations, both
the recruitment of skilled workers and the provision
of vocational training can serve to meet the need for
skills. Hence, both are treated as dependent varia-
bles in the analysis. The share of training posts of-
2 For further information on the IAB Establishment Panel cf.
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fered in the previous year, in other words both those
that were occupied and those which were vacant, is
used as a measure of the need for trainees. The
measure of the need for skilled workers is the share
of jobs offered to skilled workers in the first half of
the year under observation, in each case in relation
to all workers in the firm.3 Workers who have un-
dergone vocational training, who have comparable
vocational experience or a university degree are
classed as skilled workers.
Both share values are between zero and one, and
indeed assume these values. The use of a tobit
model for estimation is not ideal since a share value
below zero is not possible, but the tobit model is
orientated towards censored values because of un-
observability. A logit model taking the shape of
E(log[y/(1- y)]|x)=x  could be estimated, but
does not provide a perfect description of the availa-
ble data since it is not defined for y = 0, and y = 1,
and E(log[y/(1- y)]|x) cannot be transformed into
E(y|x) without difficulty (Papke/Wooldridge 1996).
Both share values are thus estimated with the frac-
tional logit proposed by Papke/Wooldridge (1996),
sincethis canrepresent thespreadofthe sharevalues.
The fractional logit model, which is used here for
estimating the shares, takes on the general form:
E(yi|xi)=G(xi ), (3)
where 0  yi  1 applies and xi is the vector of the
explanatory variables,   is the coefficient vector,
i = 1,2,...,N and N is the number of observations.
G(xi ) assumes the form of a probability density
function of the logistic function G(z), and 0 
G(z)  1 applies. The coefficients are obtained by
maximising the Bernoulli log likelihood function
li(b)=yi log[G(xib) ]+( 1- yi)log[1 - G(xib)] (4)
(Papke/Wooldridge 1996).
In order to determine the influence of the depen-
dent variables on both the independent variables
“share of training places offered” and “share of jobs
offered for skilled workers”, these are estimated us-
ing the Seemingly Unrelated Cluster-Adjusted
Sandwich Estimator (SURE) proposed by Weesie
(1999): This method makes it possible to study
3 The variable actually needed, namely the expected demand for
skilled workers at the time of completion of vocational training,
in other words in two to three years, is not available in the IAB
Establishment Panel. For this reason, the current demand for
skilled workers is used as a proxy variable.
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whether the same independent variables have a sim-
ilar impact on two (or more) dependent variables:
y1 = α0 + x1i  + u1 (5.1)
y2 = γ0 + x2i  + u2 (5.2)
Using a test proposed by Breusch/Pagan (1980), it is
examined whether the precondition for the use of a
SURE approach is met, namely the non-diagonality
of the covariance matrix of the disturbance values.
Furthermore, as in a Hausman test, the coefficients
of the individual estimates are compared (Weesie
1999):
H0 :  -  = 0 (5.3)
Other conceivable methods, for example a Heck-
man correction or the use of instrumental variables,
are impossible since the need for skills Ð expressed
on the one hand by the demand for skilled workers
and on the other hand by the demand for trainees Ð
depends on the same influencing values. Both proce-
dures, however, would require variables which cor-
relate with the demand for apprentices, but not with
the demand for skilled workers or vice versa. How-
ever, such variables are not available in the IAB Es-
tablishment Panel.
Along with Heidenreich (1998) and Baethge et al.
(2007), one should presume that the matching of the
skills imparted to those actually required tends to
have more of a reducing impact on training in the
service sector than in manufacturing. A decline in
employment in the secondary sector, underway
since the mid-nineties, has also been accompanied
by a fall in the number of trainees. The number of
employees in the tertiary sector has grown in the
same period, but the number of trainees cannot
keep pace with this growth (Bundesministerium für
Bildung und Forschung 2005). In order to accommo-
date these different presumptions and developments
in the secondary and tertiary sectors, the estimates
are implemented separately for the two economic
sectors.
It should also be pointed out that the study pre-
sented here does not measure uncertainty as such.
Rather, the impact of (soft) indicators on training
behaviour is analysed. Accordingly, it cannot be
ruled out that the results are distorted. Because of
the theoretical considerations, it is presumed that
these indicators have an impact, on the anticipated
retention rate via the unobservable uncertainty and,
hence, that they influence training. This analysis also
does not make it possible to say whether increased
uncertainty leads to less training since only a cross-Lutz Bellmann and Florian Janik To recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own?
section of the IAB Establishment Panel is used as a
data basis. Fixed effects, such as firm sizes or the
sector, may also be the cause of the correlations that
were identified.
3.3 Variables and hypotheses
In order to model uncertainty on the basis of com-
petitive pressure, as proposed by Schank (2003), a
distinction is made between competitive pressure on
the international markets (globalisation) and that on
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the domestic market. The influence of globalisation
is measured by the firm’s export share, i.e. its ex-
ports as a percentage of turnover in the last business
year. In line with the Acemoglu-Pischke model, a
negative correlation with the share of training places
offered and a positive one with the share of skilled
workers is anticipated since firms with international
linkages are under greater competitive pressure and
this reduces the probability that they can offer the
trained workers jobs on completion of training. As
with Schank (2003), the export share is portrayed by
three dummies each taking on the value of “one” if
the share is 1Ð10 percent, 11Ð25 percent or more
than 25 percent respectively. These and the follow-
ing considerations are summarised in Table 1.
A lower training intensity and a larger share of
skilled workers recruited is also to be expected for
firms with higher competitive pressure at national
level. A yardstick for competition intensity is the
concentration of workers in the sector in which the
firm is active. The calculation of the index is based
on the procedure according to Herfindahl-Hirsch-
mann. If n states the number of firms, the index va-
ries between 1/n (all firms have the same number of
workers, considerable competition) and 1 (a firm
has all workers, no competition).4 A high index
value should therefore coincide with a large demand
for trainees. This can be put down to lower uncer-
tainty as to continued employment by virtue of the
less fierce competition in the sector. Firms which are
subject to less competition need spend less time
worrying about orders. One may also assume that
the workers have fewer external options in less com-
petitive sectors.
Three variables are included in the model which
represents the stability of the employment relation-
ships since, according to the theory, high staff turno-
ver leads to lower training intensity in firms. In ac-
cordance with the “low quit Ð high training” and
“high quit Ð low training” equilibriums derived by
Acemoglu/Pischke (1998), the share of worker resig-
nations as a percentage of all workers is included in
the estimate equations. According to the theory, a
negative correlation with the share of trainees is ex-
pected since in a firm with a large number of resig-
nations the margin obtained by investing in general
human capital is reduced by the departure of the
trained workers. Also, a large share of worker resig-
nations may signify considerable instances of suc-
cessful poaching by other enterprises, also leading
4 The calculation is implemented using the establishment file of
the Federal Employment Agency at 3-digit level of the classifica-
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to the expectation that a firm will react by reducing
its training efforts (Beckmann 2002a). A similar ar-
gument can be applied to the variables “share of
temporary employment” and the churning rate,5
which indicates the share of staff turnover that does
not contribute to changes in the staff headcount.
Both are also used as a measure of the stability of
employment relationships. Accordingly, a negative
correlation is presumed to exist in each case with
the share of trainees, and a positive one with the
jobs offered for skilled workers.
The third source of uncertainty, namely the match-
ing of the skills taught in training to rapidly chang-
ing markets, is represented by five variables in the
model. It appears plausible that firms with a consid-
erable skill requirement which are operating in a dy-
namic market also employ many skilled workers.
Hence, their share of the workforce is included in
the model. Furthermore, the amount of investment
in information technology and additional invest-
ment as a share of all investment expenditure is ac-
commodated. A dummy takes on the value of one
if the enterprise’s technical plant is highly modern.
Furthermore, the amount of investment per worker
is incorporated into the model. On the basis of the
arguments put forward by Heidenreich (1998), who
claims that the dual system of training is less adapta-
ble to dynamic markets, a negative correlation is ex-
pected in each case. Conversely, it follows from this
argument that firms with a considerable demand for
skilled workers will be more likely to attempt to
cover this need by recruiting additional skilled
workers.
Furthermore, variables are included in the model
which, although they are not directly associated with
uncertainty, may nonetheless be relevant to the
training decision. Since wage structure compres-
sions, which count against skilled workers, constitute
an incentive to provide training (Acemoglu/Pischke
1998, 1999a, 1999b), as with Beckmann (2002a) a
dummy is used for denoting whether firms are
bound by collective agreements. It can be presumed
that such firms invest more in training. The same
applies to remuneration above the collectively
agreed rates, which Acemoglu/Pischke interpret as
an indication of efficiency wages, which in turn con-
5 This “churning rate” (CR) describes the part of worker mobility
which cannot be explained by the change in the number of work-
ers in a firm. It is calculated as follows:
CR =( H + S -|H - S|)/L, where H stands for the number of re-
cruitments, S for the number of departures and L for the average
number of workers in the period under observation. There are
several measuring concepts for the “churning rate”. The “churn-
ing rate” used here is calculated as in Alda/Allaart/Bellmann
(2005).
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tribute to wage compression and are assumed to
have a positive impact on the share of trainees. A
further dummy therefore takes on the value of one
if wages are paid above the collectively agreed rates.
On the basis of the data available, however, it is not
possible, in this way to portray which groups of indi-
viduals (e.g. highly-skilled, low-skilled or the train-
ees themselves) enjoy this increased remuneration.
The economic situation of the firm is represented by
two variables. A dummy is included if the firms have
evaluated their profit situation in the past year as
“three” or worse on an ordinal scale from “one”
(very good) to “five” (poor). Secondly, employment
growth in the firm is incorporated into the model.
On the basis of the costs incurred in vocational
training, it can be presumed that firms in which em-
ployment is growing are more likely to be able to
afford training and that firms with a poor income
situation are accordingly less committed to training
(Beckmann 2002a).
The company-internal decision-making structures
can also be significant for the training decision. Two
dummies are therefore formed which state whether
the firm is foreign-owned or is an independent com-
pany. A positive correlation is presumed to exist in
the case of independent companies, and a negative
correlation is expected in the case of foreign enter-
prises. It has been shown in empirical terms that in-
dependent companies are more committed to train-
ing than branches (Niederalt 2004). Foreign-owned
firms are said to provide less training because of a
lack of training traditions and higher information
costs on the dual system (Niederalt 2004). A further
dummy states whether a works council exists in the
firm. Although no well-founded theoretical reason-
ing exists to date, it has been shown in several em-
pirical studies that the existence of a works council
has a negative impact on the provision of training
(Niederalt 2004).
Both Neubäumer/Bellmann (1999) and Niederalt
(2004) have shown that the provision of training in-
creases with firm size, but that training intensity
falls. Since the analysis observes both firms which
engage in training and firms which do not, as with
Beckmann (2002a) one may not expect an effect to
be exerted by the ten firm size dummies included.
A further reason for including the dummies is the
data set used. Since the respondent firms in the IAB
Establishment Panel are selected using a stratified
random selection (Bellmann 2002), it would be nec-
essary according to DuMouchel/Duncan (1983) and
Winship/Radbill (1994) to carry out the control pro-
cedure for the level variables. For this reason, dum-
mies for the federal state and for sectoral affiliationLutz Bellmann and Florian Janik To recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own?
are included in addition to firm size. Furthermore,
the sector dummies also partly control for different
net costs of training in the various economic activi-
ties (Niederalt 2004). The distribution of the varia-




Table 2 shows the estimation results for manufactur-
ing. An unexpected picture is revealed regarding the
potential sources of uncertainty as to being able to
retain trained workers after training. While it is pos-
sible to recognise the expected negative influence
of international competition on training intensity,
measured against the export share, a significant ex-
planation of the share of the training places offered
is, however, only provided by the dummies for a
1 % to 10 % and for a 11 % to 25 % export share.
The national competition index also has an influ-
ence, but not the positive one that was anticipated.
In contradistinction to the theoretical considera-
tions, the variables on employment stability in the
firm have no independent influence on the share of
trainees. That said, the churning rate and a large
share of temporary contracts both have a positive
influence on the share of jobs offered for skilled
workers. In contradistinction to Beckmann (2002a),
the share of resignations is not significant. High staff
turnover appears not to exert an influence on the
training intensity in manufacturing, but it does exert
an influence on the demand for already qualified
workers.
The indicators of the modernity of the firm show
contradictory results. Manufacturing firms which
make large investments also train more. The share
of skilled workers exerts a positive influence on the
demand for external skilled workers, and has a nega-
tive correlation, albeit not a significant one, with
training intensity. Also, these variables thus impact
at best on the demand for skilled workers, but not
on that for trainees.
The estimation of the profit situation does not exert
an influence on the training intensity, and not on
the demand for skilled workers in the firms, either.
However, a link can be identified between the
6 The age of the firm and the regional unemployment rate were
initially included in the estimate model. Like the separate esti-
mate by firm size classes, however, this provided no additional
information.
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growth of the firm and the demand for skilled work-
ers, but there is no independent influence on train-
ing intensity. As might be expected, foreign-owned
firms also train less. The negative influence of the
works council on training is in line with the results
obtained by Niederalt (2004). The positive influence
of collective bargaining on the provision of training
also corresponds with the results from other surveys
(e.g. Niederalt 2004, Beckmann 2002a). Firms bound
by collective agreements train more.
To sum it up, it can be stated that the considerations
made regarding uncertainty and its impact on train-
ing and the external recruitment of skilled workers
in manufacturing are not confirmed. The theoretical
approach is therefore not well suited to explain the
training behaviour of firms in manufacturing. The
only slightly significant Breusch-Pagan test also cor-
responds with this picture. Hence, in manufacturing
there tends not to be a correlation between the de-
mand for skilled workers and that for trainees. It
should be pointed out once more here that the indi-
cators used for the various causes of uncertainty
tend to be soft, and therefore distortions due to mis-
specifications cannot be ruled out.
Services
The fact that the demand for skilled workers and
the demand for apprentices in this sector of the
economy are interrelated is also confirmed by the
result of the Breusch-Pagan test. The estimate re-
sults for the service sector from Table 3 also confirm
the considerations as to uncertainty.
This does not apply to the variables which measure
national and international competitive pressure,
however. None of these have any significant impact
on training behaviour.
The negative link between the share of skilled work-
ers and the provision of training, coupled with the
positive link with the demand for skilled workers,
supports Heidenreich’s thesis (1998). Both of the co-
efficients also differ highly significantly from one an-
other. Service-providers with a relatively large num-
ber of skilled workers are therefore more likely to
meet their need for skilled workers by recruiting
new workers rather than by engaging in vocational
training. Heidenreich (1998) puts this down to the
low level of adaptability of dual vocational training
to the requirements of a knowledge-based society.
It therefore also appears to be plausible that this
effect is found more in the growing service sector
than in the secondary sector. The other variables in-
tended to portray the modernity or innovativeness
of enterprises, however, have no significant effect onTo recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own? Lutz Bellmann and Florian Janik
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the share of training places offered, which rather
puts the significance of these considerations into
perspective.
The findings on staff turnover and flexibility also
correspond with the theoretical considerations. Both
a high churning rate and a large share of temporary
employment relationships reduce firms’ provision of
training. At the same time, both variables have a
positive impact on the demand for skilled workers
and differ significantly from one another. The resig-
nation rate has no significant effect. In this sense,
the thesis of Acemoglu/Pischke (1998) of the “low
quit Ð high training” and the “high quit Ð low train-
ing” equilibriums appears initially to have been
countered. The idea on which this is based, namely
that high staff turnover is an indication of a lower
probability of continued employment, to which
firms react by reduced provision of training, is con-
firmed, however.
As is the case in manufacturing, in the service sector,
too, the profit situation and employment growth do
not impact on the provision of training. However, a
positive effect of growth on the demand for skilled
workers can be ascertained. The further control var-
iables “works council”, “foreign owners” and “inde-
pendent company” demonstrate a similar picture to
that in manufacturing. However, collective agree-
ments do not impact on training behaviour, which
can be explained by the wage structure in the service
sector. Collectively-agreed wages are very low in
some of the sectors, in particular in personal servi-
ces.
Summing up, the empirical results for the service
sector bear out the theses put forward in this paper
regarding the link between uncertainty and voca-
tional training and the external recruitment of
skilled workers.
4 Summary and conclusions
In addition to high staff turnover (Acemoglu/
Pischke 1998, 1999a, 1999b), this paper analyses two
further causes of a high separation probability, in
other words of uncertainty as to the retention of
trainees in the firm after completion of training. It
is stated that high competitive pressure can reduce
the provision of training (Baethge et al. 2007) since
firms are in greater competition, and hence find it
difficult to estimate their requirements and cannot
be certain of being able to offer a job on completion
of training. Furthermore, according to Heidenreich
(1998), vocational training is also less attractive for
216 ZAF 2 und 3/2007
modern and innovative enterprises since Ð given its
relatively inflexible organisation Ð firms have little
latitude to influence the training content, and there-
fore it cannot be predicted at the beginning of the
training whether the acquired qualifications will be
useable once training has been completed. If for one
or more of the three mentioned reasons, firms are
uncertain as to whether they will be able to take on
workers after training, one may presume that in the
case of a need for skilled workers the recruitment
of already qualified workers will be preferred, and
that commitment to training will be reduced accord-
ingly.
This paper did not measure directly the indicators
of uncertainty, but (soft) indicators from the IAB
Establishment Panel for western Germany were
used and their impact on vocational training behav-
iour studied. On the basis of the theoretical consid-
erations, these indicators are presumed to exert an
impact via the unobservable uncertainty regarding
the anticipated retention rate, and hence exert an
impact on training. The fractional logit estimator
proposed by Papke/Wooldridge (1996) is deployed
here. In order to accommodate the alternative hiring
of skilled workers, both shares of employment are
estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Cluster-
Adjusted Sandwich Estimator proposed by Weesie
(1999).
Little evidence is available in manufacturing to
confirm the theoretical considerations. The results
obtained in the service sector correspond on the
whole to the considerations put forward in this pa-
per as to the significance of uncertainty for voca-
tional training behaviour. While competitive pres-
sure does not take on any major significance, the
expected correlations are, however, confirmed for
both of the other uncertainty factors Ð i.e. high staff
turnover and the matching of vocational training to
the actual skill requirements. Firms with considera-
ble movement in the headcount and with a large
share of skilled workers train less and at the same
time have a larger demand for skilled workers who
already have the requisite skills. Vocational training
is obviously not optimal for these firms with regard
to their need for skilled workers. Uncertainty as to
retention after training can help to explain the grow-
ing gap between employment and training in the ter-
tiary sector in this context. However, it should be
noted here that the indicators used for the various
causes of uncertainty tend to be weak, and therefore
distortions caused by mis-specifications cannot be
ruled out. Furthermore, because of the cross-sec-
tional view, the results may be influenced by fixed
effects such as firm size. The results can thus only
be evaluated as indications of a link between uncer-Lutz Bellmann and Florian Janik To recruit skilled workers or to train one’s own?
tainty with regard to the retention rate and training
commitment.
If this relationship were to be confirmed in further
analyses, it would mean that the dual system of voc-
ational training is faced not only by quantitative
challenges against the background that, firstly, fu-
ture employment gains are to be expected more in
the tertiary sector and, secondly, employment rela-
tionships are becoming increasingly flexible. In or-
der to make the provision of training more attrac-
tive in these sectors, and to give it a future, one ap-
proach to be explored is that of greater interlinking
between practical work experience, higher educa-
tion and dual training. The growing trend towards
more dual courses of study (cf. Ausbildung-Plus.de
2006) is an indication that the stakeholders have al-
ready recognised this need. One must also consider
how current changes in the demand for skills can be
integrated more rapidly into the dual system. Fur-
thermore, the increasing flexibilisation of the labour
market, for which many are calling, is to be critically
analysed against the background of these results.
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